Chapter 27 – Winston

Numerous facts and quotes in this chapter are taken from the article by Tom Curran: “Who was Responsible for the Dardanelles Fiasco?”, Australian Journal of Politics and History: vol 57, no. 1, 2011, pp 17-33. Many details and quotes in Tom Curran’s paper are cited from British National Archives and British newspapers, following is are extracts:

p. 25 – “On 13 February Admiral Jackson wrote an Admiralty War Staff Memorandum, which was in effect an extension of the feasibility study he had conducted for Churchill on 5 January. Jackson now concluded, emphatically: “The naval bombardment is not recommended as a sound military operation, unless a strong military force is ready to assist in the operation, or at least, follow it up immediately the forts are silenced.” Jackson’s memorandum was read out to a meeting of the War Council on 16 February. Kitchener decided that a force comprising the ANZAC Corps (of 39,000 troops), together with the 10,000-strong Royal Naval Division should be dispatched to Lemnos, “at the earliest […] to be available in case of necessity [at the Dardanelles].” The tacit understanding was that these troops would serve as a garrison force, to occupy the Turkish forts once their guns had been silenced. Three days later the bombardment began.

p. 25-26 – “The Anglo-French Fleet opened fire on the outer forts of Orkanie, Helles, Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale at 9.51 on Friday morning, 19 February. The sound of those guns reverberated around the world the following day in a press release issued by the Admiralty and authorized by First Lord, Churchill. A prominent two-column, fullfront-page article, complete with maps, appeared in The Times on Monday 22 February, which gave an exhaustively detailed account of the naval attack, along with planned objectives, stressing that “having begun, it must be successfully carried through at all costs”. Lloyd George was furious with Churchill. As he later confided to his secretary and future wife, Frances Stevenson:

When the Cabinet gave their consent to a bombardment of the Dardanelles forts (very unwillingly) it was on the strict understanding that the operations should not be announced in the first place, so as not to commit the Government, & to enable them, if the thing should turn out to be impossible, or a more lengthy proceeding than was anticipated, to withdraw from the campaign without any discredit to themselves. This did not suit Churchill, however. On the very first day that the bombardment commenced, he broke faith with his colleagues & caused the announcement to be made in the Press with great éclat that we had begun the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts & intended to force the Straits. Thenceforth it was, of course, impossible for the Government to withdraw.

Hankey recorded that:

The [press] announcement had a remarkable effect on the attitude of the War Council. When the decision had been reached to undertake the naval bombardment it had been generally assumed the attack would be broken off in the event of failure. But when the War Council met on February 24th, notwithstanding that the Outer forts had not been finally reduced, it was felt that we were now committed to seeing the business through.

Speaker after speaker reflected this view, ‘Moreover, we were absolutely committed to seeing through the attack on the Dardanelles’ (Churchill) [Hankey’s italics]. ‘[Kitchener] felt that, if the fleet could not get through the Straits unaided, the Army ought to see the business through. The effect of a defeat in the Orient would be very serious. There could be no going back. The publicity of the announcement had committed us’ [Hankey’s italics].

p.27 – “…the fall of the outer forts created a sensation throughout Britain, Europe and America. A euphoric, celebratory atmosphere pervaded the War Council meeting on 3 March, with Churchill echoing the newspaper reports and announcing that “forts 8 and 9 [in the Straits] were in the process of being destroyed, and that the [outer] forts at the entrance had been practically demolished”. Churchill assured the War Council on 10 March, that the forts in the Straits and at the Narrows were doomed and the naval operation was well on schedule. He neglected to add, however, that Carden had telegraphed him to advise that: “The methodical reduction of the forts is not feasible without expenditure of ammunition out of all proportion to that available.” Neither did Churchill appraise the councillors that the outer forts’ guns had been destroyed, not by naval gunfire, but by parties of marines who could no

longer be put ashore.”

p. 28 – “Churchill put Kitchener further to the test, at the 24 February War Council meeting (following upon his 20 February press release) when he called for a force of 115,000 troops to be dispatched to the Dardanelles; comprising the ANZAC Corps, the Naval Division, a French Division, the 29th Division, a British Territorial Division, and a Russian Division.

Kitchener was, not surprisingly, somewhat taken aback, reminding Churchill that the attack against the Dardanelles had been planned as a naval one. Did “Mr Churchill now contemplate a land attack [as well]?” Kitchener asked. Churchill said he did not, but it was conceivable that the naval attack might be held up by mines, “and some military operation required”. Kitchener replied that although “he would risk a good deal in order to open up the Dardanelles, he was, however, unable to understand the purpose for which so many troops were required”.

Churchill answered Kitchener’s query at the next War Council meeting on 26 February, when he stated that the additional troops requested were needed “to occupy Constantinople and to compel a surrender of all the Turkish forces remaining in Europe after the Fleet had obtained command of the Sea of Marmara”. Kitchener rejected this outlandish request…

… Kitchener’s refusal of his request inspired Churchill to make the following dramatic statement which Hankey recorded thus: “Mr Churchill wished it to be placed on record that […] if a disaster occurred in Turkey owing to the insufficiency of troops, he must disclaim all responsibility.””

Curran continues to describe how the minefield (353 mines) was identified as a significant problem by Admiral Carden who requested more adequate minesweepers. Churchill ignored these concerns. Carden suffered a nervous collapse, and on 17 March 1914 was replaced by his second-in-command Rear-Admiral John De Robeck. Telegrams from Churchill to Carden and De Robeck are as quoted.

Edward Erickson in Gallipoli – The Ottoman Campaign (p.19) states that “Carden crumbled under the stress of command and relieved himself of command on 16 March for reasons of health. He had worried himself dangerously close to a nervous breakdown…”

Charles Bean, in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol I, p. 201, concludes chapter IX on The Dardanelles Expedition with the following assessment: “So, through a Churchill’s excess of imagination, a layman’s ignorance of artillery and the fatal power of young enthusiasm to convince older and more cautious brains, the tragedy of Gallipoli was born.”

The Times newspaper of London, article from 22 February 1915. Quotes take from page 6.